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Abstract: 
This paper uses variation in victimization probabilities between individuals living in 
the same community to shed new light on the costs of crime. I use panel data from the 
Mexican Family Life Survey for 2002 and 2005 and look at the impact of within-
community differences in victimization risk on changes in self-rated and mental 
health. My results from fixed effects and instrumental variable estimations point 
towards substantial negative health effects of actual victimization, which might help 
to explain the existence of compensating differentials in wages or house prices found 
in earlier studies. 
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1. Introduction 
The medical literature has long identified a negative correlation between crime and 
victimization risk on the one side and measures of health and mental well-being on the other 
side (e.g., Miller et al., 1993; Chandola, 2001; Stafford et al., 2007; Jackson and Stafford, 
2009). In economics, numerous papers have been concerned with estimating the cost of crime 
for society. Examples include willingness to pay studies for the avoidance of victimization 
(Ludwig and Cook, 2001; Cohen et al., 2004) or the calculation of compensating differentials 
for regional crime rates in either wages or house prices as predicted by models by Roback 
(1982, 1988), who also provides some evidence. Other examples in the latter group include, 
inter alia, Gerking and Neirick (1983), Blomquist et al. (1988), Smith (2005), Schmidt and 
Courant (2006) and Braakmann (2009) for wages and Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001), Lynch 
and Rasmussen (2001) and Gibbons (2004) for house prices.  
The central assumption underlying the papers looking at compensating differentials is 
that crime or victimization risks lower the utility of affected individuals, thus leading to the 
need of monetary compensation. While this assumption has intuitive appeal – after all, it is 
easy to imagine that most people do not like being mugged – there have been only a few 
studies that look at where and why these utility losses actually occur. Two papers look at 
behavioral changes caused by crime and fear of crime: Hamermesh (1999) finds that 
victimization risk changes working time patterns in the US. Using the same dataset and 
econometric approach as this paper, Braakmann (2012) looks at measures individuals take to 
protect themselves, such as stopping to go out, changing routes or modes of transportation or 
starting to carrying a weapon, and their property, such as barring windows or getting an 
electronic alarm system. The logic underlying these papers is that crime might lead 
individuals away from their preferred choices, such as going out at a certain frequency or 
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working at certain times, which leads to utility losses and then ultimately to a compensating 
differential. 
Another possible reason for why we might observe compensating wage differentials 
for crime is health. Intuitively, a link between health and crime (or victimization) is rather 
plausible: Some crimes, such as bodily harm, manslaughter or murder, are essentially defined 
by some loss of (physical) health on the side of the victim. In terms of mental health, it is 
easy to imagine that victimization can lead to traumata or that states of prolonged fear (of 
crime) might affect mental health or well-being. Finally, victimization risks might also lead 
to stress, which might than affect the risk of illnesses through its impact on the body’s 
immune system. As long as individuals loose utility through worsening states of health, this 
link might also help to explain the existence of compensating wage differentials for crime. A 
contribution from economists in spirit of the previously mentioned medical papers is 
Powdthavee (2005) who uses South African data and finds that victimization lowers the 
victim’s life satisfaction, which can be seen as a measure of mental health. 
In this paper, I use household data from Mexico, specifically the 2002 and 2005 
waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey, a panel survey of 40,000 individuals from roughly 
8,400 households throughout Mexico. One particular feature of this survey is that it contains 
individual measures of crime and victimization risk. Furthermore it also contains a large 
number of health outcomes, which allows for a thorough investigation of the link between 
victimization and health. In terms of victimization risks, I look (a) actual past victimization 
and (b) subjective assessments of future victimization. Specifically, I use information on 
whether an individual has ever been assaulted or robbed in its life and on a subjective 
assessment of the probability of falling victim to a crime within the next year. Looking at 
both of these measures seems sensible as that there is a large literature examining the 
consequences of objective risk and subjective assessments of that risk being different (see, 
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e.g., Sloan and Pratt, 2011, for a recent study). Furthermore, the correlation between actual 
victimization and perceived victimization risk is only 0.17, which highlights that fear of 
crime affects a greater number of people than actual victimization. 
I start by estimating individual fixed effects regressions while also controlling for 
community-time-effects, in other words by looking at the effects of changes in individual 
victimization rates or probabilities relative to changes in these characteristics in the respective 
community. Using individual victimization data has a number of advantages over the 
classical approach of using regional crime rates as a proxy for victimization risk (see 
Braakmann, 2012). First, individual victimization risks, even for individuals living in the 
same region, are likely to differ from and be more heterogeneous than regional crime rates, 
which can be seen as the average victimization risk in a region. An obvious example is the 
risk of being raped, which will likely differ at least by gender. Similarly, the risk of being 
assaulted in the street might well differ by appearance, behavior, age and the likely ability to 
fend off an attacker.  
Second, using differences in victimization risks between individuals living in the 
same region allows for a flexible control of regional factors influencing both the respective 
outcome and crime rates by regional fixed effects or regional-time fixed effects in the case of 
longitudinal data as used in this paper. Unobserved regional factors, such as negative 
economic shocks, influencing both the outcome, such as wages or rents, and crime rates are 
usually a major concern in studies of the economic consequences of crime as the canonical 
economic model of crime (Becker, 1968) predicts a negative relationship between economic 
opportunities in legal employment and an individual’s propensity to engage in crime (see, for 
example, Gould et al., 2002, for recent evidence and Piehl, 1998, and Freeman, 1999, for 
surveys). Exploiting within-region differences in victimization risks combined with regional-
time fixed effects flexibly controls for these factors without the need for extensive regional 
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controls as in Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) or Braakmann (2009), natural experiments as in 
Smith (2005) or instrumental variables as in Gibbons (2004). 
The flipside of these advantages, however, is a higher risk of simultaneity bias. While 
regional crime rates are generally more or less uninfluenced by the behavior of every single 
person in the data and regional shocks are the main worry, individual crime risks may well be 
influenced by changes in individual health or well-being. Consider for example the case 
where the fixed effects estimates indicate a non-significant effect of victimization on some 
health outcome. A possible explanation could be that crime simply does not influence health. 
However, an equally valid explanation would be that individuals whose health worsened are 
less likely to go out in the evenings, say to nightclubs, which might reduce their victimization 
risks.  
To address these concerns I rely on the same instrumental variable strategy I used in 
Braakmann (2012): Individual victimization risks are instrumented by the share of 
individuals in the respective community – excluding the respective individual – who have 
been victimized or consider victimization to be likely. The logic underlying these instruments 
is rather simple: Individuals living in the same community face the same regional 
developments in crime rates, which implies that individual victimization risks should be 
correlated with regional aggregations of these risks. The regional aggregates, however, 
should be uncorrelated with individual changes in behavior as long as the regional 
characteristics are calculated without the individual under question. The crucial assumption 
here is that regional (average) victimization risks have no direct influence on an individual’s 
health or mental state once individual risks are controlled for, which seems plausible. Note 
that this strategy only works due to the availability of measures of both individual and 
aggregate victimization risks. Without the individuals measures one would be in the typical 
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situation where regional measures of victimization are used as a proxy for individual risk. 
These typical proxy-regressions can be seen as the reduced form of my estimates. 
An important question is whether subjective beliefs about victimization risks may 
differ from some “true”, objective risk of victimization, i.e., whether individuals are actually 
able to judge their victimization risks accurately. Here, it is important to note two things: 
First, while individuals might indeed misjudge their victimization risk, they will also not 
know their “true”, objective victimization risk and consequently have no choice but rely on 
their subjective judgment. Second, given the usual level of underreporting of criminal 
activities and the risk that the resulting measurement error varies regionally, it is not clear 
whether the alternative of using reported crime rates is any better than using subjective 
beliefs. In fact, Hamermesh (1999, p. 315) points out that (subjective) fear of crime is more 
relevant to individual behavior than (objective) regional crime rates and should consequently 
be preferred.  
My estimates indicate that, first, actual victimization appears to have large, 
statistically significant and negative effects on the victims’ health, be it self-rated, actual 
medical conditions or indicators of mental health. Second, the subjective likelihood of 
victimization has a much smaller and often insignificant effect on health. In other words, the 
negative health effects of crime and victimization seem to be confined to the actual victims. 
Third, standard fixed effects estimates seem to suffer from considerable bias towards zero, as 
can be seen from the fact that the IV estimates generally tend to be much larger. Note that 
these results can be explained by good health having a positive effect on crime risks (for 
example, as sick people are more likely to stay at home where victimization risks tend to be 
relatively low), while at the same time crime (risks) having a negative effect on health. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data used. 
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Section 3 lays describes the estimation approach. Results can be found in section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Data 
I use data from the 2002 and 2005 waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey.1 The 
survey was conducted by researchers of the University Iberoamericana (UIA), the Center of 
Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas), 
the National Institute of Public Health (INSP: Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública), and the 
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). The data cover approximately 40,000 
individuals from roughly 8,400 households throughout Mexico in each wave. Crucially it also 
contains more than one household per community and year, which enables me to use 
community-time fixed effects. Communities range from small villages to cities and cover 
both urban and rural areas.  
In this paper I focus on adult respondents – defined as being 14 years of age or older – 
as several key variables, including victimization risks, are missing for children. The final 
sample used in the estimations consists of 11,736 observations for 5,883 men and 16,756 
observations for 8,393 women from 150 communities. Communities contain between 19 and 
508 individuals with an average of 95. Major reductions in the sample size from the original 
roughly 40,000 individuals occur due to the restriction to adult individuals and the 
requirement of individuals being observed in both waves. 
Victimization risks are measured by two dummy variables as in Braakmann (2012). 
The first indicates whether an individual considers it likely or very likely to be robbed or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Data and documentation are available at http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org/. 
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assaulted within the next year. In other words, it captures an individual’s expectation 
regarding its victimization risk. The second measure is a dummy variable indicating whether 
an individual has ever been assaulted, robbed or attacked in the past. This second variable is 
similar to the one used by Powdthavee (2005) in his study of the life-satisfaction effects of 
victimization in South Africa. 9% of the individuals in the sample have been victimized with 
2.3% experiencing more than one assault (up to a maximum of 10). 
The health variables can be split into two groups. The first are measures of self-rated 
health. These include a dummy for having bad self-rated health, a dummy for having worse 
health than a year ago, a dummy for expecting health to be worse next week and a dummy for 
stating that ones health is worse than that of people of comparable age and gender. The 
second groups of variables relates to mental health. It consists of a set of dummies for having 
suffered from stress, having experienced sleeping problems, frequent feelings of fear, 
frequent feelings of pessimism and frequent wishes to die during the last 4 weeks prior to the 
interview and, finally, the individual’s usual hours of sleep per night. 
From the data I also take a number of standard socio-economic controls on age and 
education. I do not control for changes in labor force status and income as these might 
themselves be influenced by health consequences of to victimization and crime risks, if, e.g., 
someone has to give up work due to injuries received when assaulted (see Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009, ch. 3.2.3 for a textbook treatment on bad controls in causal inference).  
 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.) 
 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for all variables. Note that there is a 
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considerable number of individuals who consider it likely to be victimized or have been 
victimized in the past: Around 21% of all individuals in the sample consider it likely to 
become victim of a crime within the next year and between 7% and 12% have become a 
victim in the past. The fact that more people consider victimization likely than actually 
experience it is not unusual and often found in the literature (e.g., Dominitz and Manski, 
1997).  
 
3. Estimation strategy 
Following Braakmann (2012), I estimate regressions of the form 
FE I: 
yict = Xit’β + τ*vict + ηct + αi  + εict,        (1) 
where yict is the respective outcome for individual i in community c observed in year t, vict are 
the measures of victimization risk for that individual, Xit contains the socio-demographic 
characteristics described above, αi is an individual fixed effect, ηct is a community-year fixed 
effect and εic is a standard error term. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on both the 
individual and the community level. The coefficients of interest are in τ, which measure the 
impact of victimization (risk) on the respective health outcome. All regressions are run 
separately for men and women. Note that the fact that yict might contain dummies is relatively 
innocuous as all variables and in particular the measures of victimization risk are essentially 
dummies, which prevents the usual issues with using a linear probability model on discrete 
outcomes (see Angrist, 2001, in the context of IV estimation). 
The individual fixed effects capture any baseline differences between individuals such 
as lifestyles or general physical appearance. Their presence implies that the effects of 
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victimization are identified through changes in individual victimization risks. The 
community-year effects capture all changes that occur on the regional level, including overall 
changes in crime rates as well as changes in the economic situation. Their inclusion also 
means that all effects are identified using within-community-within-year differences in 
victimization risk. In an alternative specification I replace the community-year effects ηct 
with separate fixed effects for communities (µc) and (ϕt) years and add some time-varying 
community characteristics Wct, specifically the local population, a dummy that is “1” if 
income opportunities have improved during the last year and three dummies indicating 
whether prices for corn, health care and other foods increased during the last year. This 
results in the specification FE II: 
FE II: 
yict = Xit’β + Wct’δ + τ* vict + µc + ϕt + αi  + εict,      (2) 
As in Braakmann (2012) the results from these two specifications usually do not differ in any 
meaningful way.  
The estimates based on equation (1) or (2) may still suffer from reverse causality or 
omitted variable bias through the omission of time-varying variables. Consider first the case 
of reverse causality: A decline in health might force an individual to stay at home more often 
(as opposed to, say, going out clubbing in the evening), which in turn might very well reduce 
its risk of falling victim to a crime. A similar case can be made for time-varying omitted 
variables. Say, an individual decides to adopt a healthier lifestyle, where lifestyle is 
unobserved. This might induce all sorts of behavioral changes, for instance, again staying at 
home more often instead of going out drinking, which might affect both victimization risks 
and health. Note that while the direction of the bias in the preceding two examples was rather 
clear, it would be equally possible to find examples that would lead to biases in other 
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directions. 
A further problem could be measurement error: If individuals are not very good at 
judging their victimization risk in a consistent way over the years, a good part of the within-
individual variation in victimization risk could be noise. While this is probably less of a 
problem for actually experienced past victimization – which does not occur that regularly in 
the life of each individual and should be a rather memorable event – it might very well be a 
bigger problem when it comes to the subjective victimization probability. Note that the 
resulting bias in this case would be towards zero. 
To attenuate these concerns I rely on the same instrumental variable strategy I used 
elsewhere (Braakmann, 2012). In a first step, I calculate for each individual the averages of 
the victimization measures using all other individuals living in the same community, denoted 
by . Effectively, these averages are simple the shares of individuals in the respective 
community, excluding the respective individual, who consider it likely to be victimized or 
have been victimized in the past. It is important to stress that there is enough variation in 
these measures within communities to make this approach sensible: The within-community 
standard deviation (over time) of the share of individuals who consider victimization to be 
likely is 0.066 (mean 0.197), which is more than half the between-community standard 
deviation of 0.119, while the corresponding value for actual victimization is 0.031 for the 
within-community standard deviation (mean 0.085) and 0.096 for the between-community 
standard deviation. 
In a second step, I use these averages as instruments for the individual measures of 
victimization risks, leading to a first stage 
vict = Xit’π +Wct’ξ + ρ*  + µc + ϕt + αi  + υict.      (3) 
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As already stated in the introduction, the logic underlying these instruments is fairly 
simple: Individuals living in the same community face the same changes in regional factors 
that might influence victimization risks, like changes in the presence of gangs or the police or 
economic downturns. Consequently, we would expect changes in aggregate measures of 
victimization to be correlated with changes in the corresponding individual measures. As the 
regional measures are calculated without the respective individual, there is no possibility of 
reverse causality. Similarly, any changes in individual life-styles or other variables that could 
lead to omitted variable bias should not influence the aggregate victimization measures. It is 
important to stress the difference between this estimation strategy and the use of regional 
crime rates as proxies for individual risk. While both my IV approach and the proxy approach 
use regional variation in crime risks, the IV approach still distinguishes between individuals 
whose individual risk changes as a result of the changes in regional risk and those whose risk 
does not change, whereas the proxy approach effectively assumes that all individuals in the 
same region face the same change in risk. 
As the instruments effectively vary only on the community-year-level, it is necessary 
to replace the community-year fixed effects with separate community and year fixed effects 
as well as some time-varying controls on the community level. This change might lead to the 
familiar concern with unobserved regionals shocks that also arises when using regional crime 
rates as a proxy for individual victimization risk. One way to test for potential biases arising 
from this change is to compare standard fixed effects estimates based on equations (1) and 
(2). As already mentioned earlier, results from these two specifications are almost identical. 
Despite this result, it is important to be aware that estimates based on FE I are 
conceptually somewhat different from those based on FE II and the IV estimates. The former 
effectively looks at how individuals behave whose victimization risk relative to their 
community in a given year changes, that is, all victimization risks in that specification are 
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relative risks. FE II and the IV estimates also use variation in victimization risk that arise 
through changes in victimization risk within communities over time. The IV and FE 2 
estimates are then again somewhat different as the former identify local average treatment 
effects, that is, effects for those individuals whose victimization risk changes because the 
average risk in the community changes, whereas the latter also contain changes in 
victimization risk due to changes in personal circumstances. 
 
 (TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.) 
 
Table 2 presents first stage results on the relationship of aggregate and individual 
measures of victimization. As we can see the results show that the instruments are correlated 
fairly strongly with the individual measures of victimization risk. All first stage F-values 
furthermore indicate the absence of any weak instrument problem. 
 
4. RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the first set of results related to self-rated health. Note first that both 
fixed effects specifications, FE I and FE II, are always very similar, which suggests that the 
included regional control variables capture all important regional time-varying confounders. 
In general, the results indicate no or almost no relationship between the subjective probability 
of victimization and self-rated health with the exception of the expectation of worsening 
health for women. Actual victimization on the other hand is often associated with a 
significant worsening of the respective health measures: Individuals who have been 
victimized are more likely to report a decrease in health relative to one year ago. They are 
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also more likely to expect a further worsening of their health and – at least when they are 
women – are more likely to report having bad health relative to people of the same age and 
gender. It should be stressed that the IV estimates are generally (much) larger than the 
corresponding FE estimates, indicating that the already mentioned biases are relevant and on 
balance negative. The fact that the IV estimates are more likely to be insignificant can easily 
be explained by their well-known lower statistical efficiency. A note of caution, however, is 
probably in order when it comes to the female results for the decrease in health relative to one 
year ago. Here, the IV estimates appear to be unrealistically large indicating an 
approximately 106% increase in the likelihood to report decreased health. 
 
 (TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.) 
Finally, table 4 presents results regarding mental health. The main result emerging 
from the table is that crime victims are much more likely to state that they are suffering from 
sleeping problems and also sleep between 2 and 3 hours less per night than individuals who 
have not been victimized. For the remaining outcomes both the FE and the IV estimates are 
generally insignificant and also not particularly large in magnitude when looking at men. For 
women, the picture is somewhat different: Some FE estimates indicate that victimization 
might increase the risk of feeling pessimistic and experiencing death wishes. The 
corresponding IV estimates tend to be insignificant, but are usually not small, which means 
that imprecise estimation might rather than true non-effects might be responsible for this 
result. Finally, there are also some hints that the subjective likelihood of victimization may 
lead to frequent feelings of fear or pessimism and to sleeping problems for women. For other 
outcomes and men, the subjective risk of victimization does not seem to have any effect, 
which is similar to the results for the other outcome groups. 
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(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.) 
To summarize the main results: First, actual victimization appears to have large, 
statistically significant and negative effects on the victims’ health, be it self-rated or 
indicators of mental health. These results suggest that some of the compensating differentials 
related to crime that were found in earlier studies might arise because of negative health 
effects. Second, the subjective likelihood of victimization has a much smaller and often 
insignificant effect on health. In other words, the negative health effects of crime and 
victimization seem to be confined to the actual victims. Third, standard fixed effects 
estimates seem to suffer from considerable negative bias, as can be seen from the fact that the 
IV estimates generally tend to be much larger. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provided evidence on some of the non-monetary costs of crime using data 
from Mexico, a country with a relatively severe crime problem. I exploited within-
community differences in changes in individual victimization risks and used a combination of 
fixed effects and instrumental variable estimation. I also considered the effects of both 
subjective believes about victimization risks and past victimization to shed light on the 
question whether the costs of crime are borne only by the actual victims or crime affects other 
individual in the same community.  
The results indicate substantial negative health effects of actual victimization, which 
might help to explain both the large willingness to pay for crime reduction and the existence 
of compensating differentials in wages or house prices found in earlier studies. The results 
also indicate that these negative effects are found only for actual crime victims, but not for 
those just expecting to be victimized. This latter result is different from studies looking at 
behavioral changes such as Hamermesh (1999) and Braakmann (2012) that generally find 
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effects when looking at measures such as fear of crime. On a political level, the results also 
suggests that a successful battle against crime might also be good for public health.  
References 
Angrist, Joshua D., 2001. “Estimation of Limited-Dependent Variable Models with Dummy 
Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice.” Journal of Business 
and Economic Statistics 19(1): 2-28. 
Angrist, Joshua, D. and Joern-Steffen Pischke. 2009. “Mostly harmless econometrics – an 
empiricist’s companion.” Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ayres, Ian, and Steven D. Levitt. 1998. “Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable 
Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 113(1): 43-77. 
Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of 
Political Economy 76(2): 169-217. 
Blomquist, Glenn C., Mark C. Berger, and John P. Hoehn. 1988. “New Estimates of Quality 
of Life in Urban Areas.” American Economic Review 78(1): 89-107. 
Bowes, David R., and Keith R. Ihlanfeldt. 2001. “Identifying the Impacts of Rail Transit 
Stations on Residential Property Values.” Journal of Urban Economics 50(1): 1-25. 
Braakmann, Nils. 2009. “Is there a compensating wage differential for high crime levels? 
First evidence from Europe.” Journal of Urban Economics 66(3): 218–231. 
Braakmann, Nils. 2012. “How do individuals deal with victimization and victimization risk? 
Longitudinal evidence from Mexico.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 84(1), pp. 335-344. 
Chandola, Tarani, 2001. “The fear of crime and area differences in health”, Health and Place 
 17 
7(2): 105-116. 
Cohen, Mark A., Roland T. Rust, Sara Steen, and Simon T. Tidd. 2004. “Willingness-to-pay 
for crime control programs.” Criminology 42(1): 89–110. 
Dominitz, Jeff, and Charles F. Manski. 1997. “Perceptions of Economic Insecurity: Evidence 
from the Survey of Economic Expectations.” Public Opinion Quarterly 61(2): 261-
287. 
Freeman, Richard B. 1999. “The Economics of Crime.” In: Ashenfelter, Orley, and David 
Card (eds.). Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3C. North-Holland: 3529-3571. 
Gerking, Shelby D., and William N. Neirick. 1983. “Compensating Differences and 
Interregional Wage Differentials.” Review of Economics and Statistics 65(3): 483-
487. 
Gibbons, Steve. 2004. “The Cost of Urban Property Crime.” The Economic Journal 
114(499): F441-F463. 
Gould, Eric D., Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard. 2002. “Crime rates and local 
labor market opportunities in the United States: 1979–1997.” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 84(1): 45–61. 
Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1999. “Crime and the Timing of Work.” Journal of Urban Economics 
45(2): 311-330. 
Jackson, Jonathan and Mai Stafford, 2009. “Public Health and fear of crime – A prospective 
cohort study.” British Journal of Criminology 49(6): 832-847. 
 18 
Ludwig, Jens and Philip J. Cook. 2001. “The Benefits of Reducing Gun Violence: Evidence 
from Contingent-Valuation Survey Data.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 22(3): 
207-226. 
Lynch, Allen K., and David W. Rasmussen, 2001. “Measuring the impact of crime on house 
prices.” Applied Economics 33(15): 1981-1989. 
Miller, Ted R., Mark A Cohen and Shelli B. Rossman, 1993. “Victim costs of violent crime 
and resulting injuries.” Health Affairs 12(4): 186-197. 
Roback, Jennifer. 1982. “Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life.” Journal of Political 
Economy 90(6): 1257-1278. 
Roback, Jennifer. 1988. “Rents, and Amenities: Differences Among Workers and Regions.” 
Economic Inquiry 26(1): 23-41. 
Piehl, Anne M. 1998. “Economic conditions, work and crime.” In: Tonry, Michael (Ed.). The 
Handbook of Crime and Punishment. Oxford University Press, Oxford” 302–319. 
Powdthavee, Nattavudh. 2007. “Unhappiness and Crime: Evidence from South Africa.” 
Economica 72(287): 531-547. 
Schmidt, Lucie, and Paul N. Courant. 2006. “Sometimes Close is Good Enough: The Value 
of Nearby Environmental Amenities.” Journal of Regional Science 46(5): 931-951. 
Sloan, Frank and Alyssa Pratt, 2011. “Information, risk perceptions, and smoking choices of 
youth.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 42(2): 161-193. 
Smith, Claudia. 2005. “Immigration, Crime and Compensating Wage Differential: Evidence 
from the Mariel Boatlift.” Mimeo, Syracuse. 
Stafford, Mau, Tarani Chandola and Michael Marmot, 2007. “Association between fear of 
 19 
crime and mental health and physical functioning.” American Journal of Public 
Health 97(11): 2076-2081. 
Stutzer, Alois, and Bruno S. Frey. 2008. “Stress that Doesn't Pay: The Commuting Paradox.” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 110(2): 339-366.
 20 
 
Table 1: 
Descriptive statistics 
 Men Women 
 Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Considers victimization in next year likely 0.210 0.407 0.218 0.413 
Ever victimized 0.124 0.330 0.069 0.253 
Share of individuals in community who consider 
victimization to be likely 
0.211 0.134 0.214 0.134 
Share of victimized people in community 0.089 0.094 0.092 0.096 
Has bad self-rated health 0.041 0.198 0.058 0.233 
Health has decreased compared with 1 year ago 0.090 0.286 0.131 0.338 
Expects health to be worse next week 0.063 0.242 0.070 0.255 
Bad health relative to people of same age and sex 0.054 0.225 0.085 0.279 
Suffered from stress in the last 4 weeks 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.030 
Hours of sleep per day 7.612 1.323 7.813 1.304 
Had problems sleeping in last 4 weeks 0.035 0.183 0.057 0.231 
Felt frequently pessimistic in last 4 weeks 0.025 0.155 0.047 0.212 
Felt fear frequently in last 4 weeks 0.018 0.133 0.032 0.177 
Frequently wished to die during last 4 weeks 0.011 0.104 0.020 0.141 
Age (years) 41.044 17.556 39.546 16.221 
Elementary schooling 0.406 0.491 0.434 0.496 
Completed Jr. high school 0.248 0.432 0.252 0.434 
Completed high school 0.140 0.347 0.122 0.327 
College graduate 0.103 0.304 0.073 0.260 
Community variables (based on interview with community official) 
Local income opportunities improved during the 
last year 
0.185 0.388 0.188 0.391 
Local population 223,406 429,524 225,909 432,545 
Price of health care increased 0.588 0.492 0.576 0.494 
Price of corn increased 0.383 0.486 0.378 0.485 
Price of other food increased 0.457 0.498 0.448 0.497 
Observations 11,736 16,756 
All variables based on individual survey responses except for community variables at the 
bottom of the table, which are based on an interview with a community official. 
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Table 2: 
First stage results 
 Men Women 
Outcome Considers 
victimization 
likely (1 = yes) 
Ever 
victimized 
(1 = yes) 
Considers 
victimization 
likely (1 = yes) 
Ever 
victimized 
(1 = yes) 
Share of individuals in 
community who consider 
victimization to be likely 
(0 to 1) 
0.7191*** -0.0270 0.7732*** 0.0746*** 
 (0.0764) (0.0556) (0.0724) (0.0231) 
Share of victimized 
people in community  
(0 to 1) 
0.1804 0.9698*** -0.0145 0.3711*** 
 (0.1151) (0.1100) (0.1334) (0.0619) 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-value excluded 
instruments 
47.10 49.40 86.81 25.51 
F-value for Angrist-
Pischke test of excluded 
instruments 
90.34 68.84 73.02 36.25 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk 
F statistic 
36.78 20.82 
Observations 11,736 16,756 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual and the community 
level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Control variables in all specifications are age and age squared and dummies for 
having completed elementary school, Jr. High School, High School and College with no 
schooling being the base alternative. Regional controls are the local population, a dummy 
indicating whether income opportunities have improved compared to last year, and dummies 
indicating whether the prices of corn, other food and health care have risen respectively. 
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Table 3: 
Victimization risk and self-rated health 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual and the community 
level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Control variables in all specifications are age and age squared and dummies for 
having completed elementary school, Jr. High School, High School and College with no 
schooling being the base alternative. Regional controls are the local population, a dummy 
indicating whether income opportunities have improved compared to last year, and dummies 
indicating whether the prices of corn, other food and health care have risen respectively.
 Men Women 
 FE I FE II IV FE I FE II IV 
 Bad self-rated health 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
-
0.0097* 
-0.0089 0.0183 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0122 
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0463) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0538) 
Ever victimized 0.0024 0.0026 -0.0057 0.0168 0.0166 0.0321 
 (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0924) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.1808) 
 Health has decreased compared with 1 year ago 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
-0.0068 -0.0053 0.0347 0.0069 0.0080 -0.0969 
(0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0981) (0.0094) (0.0091) (0.0922) 
Ever victimized 0.0095 0.0208 0.3846*** 0.0350* 0.0469** 1.0577*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0158) (0.1142) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.3657) 
 Expects health to be worse next week 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
-0.0059 -0.0042 0.0298 0.0140** 0.0157*** 0.0004 
(0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0635) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0642) 
Ever victimized 0.0231* 0.0265** 0.1230 0.0147 0.0166 0.2805 
 (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0922) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.2062) 
 Bad health relative to people of same age and sex 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
0.0094 0.0094 -0.0234 0.0066 0.0038 -0.1480** 
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0514) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0642) 
Ever victimized 0.0032 0.0051 0.0945 0.0225* 0.0283** 0.5568*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0869) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.2161) 
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Community-year fixed 
effects 
yes no no yes no no 
Community fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes 
Year fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes 
Regional controls no yes yes no yes no 
N 11,736 16,756 
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Table 4: 
Victimization risk and indicators of mental health 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual and the community 
level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Control variables in all specifications are age and age squared and dummies for 
having completed elementary school, Jr. High School, High School and College with no 
schooling being the base alternative. Regional controls are the local population, a dummy 
 Men Women 
 FE I FE II IV FE I FE II IV 
 Suffered from stress last 4 weeks 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
0.0007 0.0006 -0.0060 0.0012 0.0012* 0.0008 
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0055) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0050) 
Ever victimized 0.0021 0.0021 0.0005 0.0024 0.0024 0.0153 
 (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0050) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0159) 
 Hours of sleep per night 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
-0.0309 -0.0323 0.3744 0.0249 0.0206 0.2611 
(0.0397) (0.0370) (0.3289) (0.0373) (0.0367) (0.3748) 
Ever victimized -0.0808 -
0.1251** 
-
2.0157*** 
-0.0980 -0.1321** -
3.2442** 
 (0.0612) (0.0637) (0.6343) (0.0646) (0.0623) (1.3328) 
 Had problems sleeping last 4 weeks 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
0.0087 0.0080 -0.0352 0.0134* 0.0146* -0.0262 
(0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0489) (0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0701) 
Ever victimized 0.0081 0.0159* 0.2894*** 0.0272* 0.0309** 0.4409* 
 (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0842) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.2540) 
 Felt frequently pessimistic last 4 weeks 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
0.0072 0.0066 -0.0408 0.0085 0.0095* 0.0527 
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0283) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0552) 
Ever victimized 0.0068 0.0046 0.0209 0.0250** 0.0261** 0.2246 
 (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0517) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.2118) 
 Experienced frequent feelings of fear last 4 weeks 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
0.0050 0.0052 0.0066 0.0140** 0.0150*** 0.0387 
(0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0330) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0512) 
Ever victimized 0.0055 0.0028 -0.0433 0.0034 0.0046 0.1705 
 (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0431) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.1681) 
 Frequently wished to die during last 4 weeks 
Considers victimization in 
next year likely 
-0.0011 -0.0013 0.0136 0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0432 
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0214) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0344) 
Ever victimized 0.0028 0.0021 -0.0028 0.0178** 0.0180** 0.0766 
 (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0472) (0.0084) (0.0076) (0.1108) 
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Community-year fixed 
effects 
yes no no yes no no 
Community fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes 
Year fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes 
Regional controls no yes yes no yes no 
N 11,736 16,756 
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indicating whether income opportunities have improved compared to last year, and dummies 
indicating whether the prices of corn, other food and health care have risen respectively. 
